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Paul Grice  favored a closely related view in which intention consists in the agent's willing that certain results ensue, combined with the belief that they will ensue as a consequence of the particular willing in question.
This causal role, he argues, is distinct from the characteristic causal or functional roles of expectations, desires, hopes, and other attitudes about the agent's future actions.
For instance, he holds that intentions and beliefs are structurally parallel in the following key respect. Both involve the endorsing of an appropriate type of structured content.
Orders, commands, and requests all have practitions as their contents as well, but, as a rule, these will represent prescriptions directed at others.
They express the content, e. Other philosophers, e. Still others, notably Annette Bair , have wanted to construe the logical objects of intending as non-propositional and as represented by an unmodified infinitive.
Castaneda was concerned to assign a systematic semantics to the chief locutions that figure in practical thinking and reasoning.
It was a chief ambition in his investigations to chart out the structure of implicative relations that hold between propositions and practitions of these varied sorts and thereby to elaborate the conceptual foundations of deontic logic.
Individuals do not always act alone. They may also share intentions and act in concert. There has been growing interest in the philosophy of action about how shared intention and action should be understood.
A central concern is whether the sharing of intentions should be given a reductive account in terms of individual agency see Searle for an important early discussion of the issue.
Michael Bratman  offers an influential proposal in a reductive vein that makes use of his planning conception of intentions.
A central condition in his account of shared cooperative activity is that each participant individually intends the activity and pursues it in accordance with plans and subplans that do not conflict with those of the other participants.
But Margaret Gilbert  has objected that reductive approaches overlook the mutual obligations between participants essential to shared activity: each participant is obligated to the others to do his or her share of the activity, and unilateral withdrawal constitutes a violation of this obligation.
Gilbert argues that a satisfactory account of these mutual obligations requires that we give up reductive individualist accounts of shared activity and posit a primitive notion of joint commitment see also Tuomela, Roth  takes seriously the mutual obligations identified by Gilbert, and offers an account that, while non-reductive, nevertheless invokes a conception of intention and commitment that in some respects is friendlier to that invoked by Bratman.
It is not entirely clear whether, in positing primitive joint commitments, Gilbert means to commit herself to the ontological thesis that there exist group agents over and above the constituent individual agents.
Pettit  defends just such a thesis. The resulting discontinuity between individual and collective perspectives suggests, on his view, that groups can be rational, intentional agents distinct from their members.
For many years, the most intensely debated topic in the philosophy of action concerned the explanation of intentional actions in terms of the agent's reasons for acting.
As stated previously, Davidson and other action theorists defended the position that reason explanations are causal explanations — explanations that cite the agent's desires, intentions, and means-end beliefs as causes of the action [see Goldman ].
These causalists about the explanation of action were reacting against a neo-Wittgensteinian outlook that claimed otherwise.
In retrospect, the very terms in which the debate was conducted were flawed. First, for the most part, the non-causalist position relied chiefly on negative arguments that purported to show that, for conceptual reasons, motivating reasons could not be causes of action.
Davidson did a great deal to rebut these arguments. It was difficult, moreover, to find a reasonably clear account of what sort of non-causal explanation the neo-Wittgensteinians had in mind.
Unfortunately, the import of these qualifications has been less than perspicuous. George Wilson  and Carl Ginet  follow Anscombe in holding that reason explanations are distinctively grounded in an agent's intentions in action.
Both authors hold that ascriptions of intention in action have the force of propositions that say of a particular act of F ing that it was intended by its agent to G by means of F ing , and they claim that such de re propositions constitute non-causal reason explanations of why the agent F ed on the designated occasion.
Wilson goes beyond Ginet in claiming that statements of intention in action have the meaning of. In this analyzed form, the teleological character of ascriptions of intention in action is made explicit.
Given the goal-directed nature of action, one can provide a familiar kind of teleological explanation of the relevant behavior by mentioning a goal or purpose of the behavior for the agent at the time, and this is the information 9 conveys.
Or, alternatively, when a speaker explains that. Most causalists will allow that reason explanations of action are teleological but contend that teleological explanations in terms of goals — purposive explanations in other words — are themselves analyzable as causal explanations in which the agent's primary reason s for F ing are specified as guiding causes of the act of F ing.
Therefore, just as there are causalist analyses of what it is to do something intentionally, so there are similar counterpart analyses of teleological explanations of goal directed and, more narrowly, intentional action.
The causalist about teleological explanation maintains that the goal of the behavior for the agent just is a goal the agent had at the time, one that caused the behavior and, of course, one that caused it in the right way [for criticism, see Sehon , ].
It has not been easy to see how these disagreements are to be adjudicated. The claim that purposive explanations do or do not reduce to suitable counterpart causal explanations is surprisingly elusive.
It is not clear, in the first place, what it is for one form of explanation to reduce to another. Finally, Abraham Roth  has pointed out that reasons explanations might both be irreducibly teleological and also cite primary reasons as efficient causes at the same time.
It is arguable that similar explanations, having both causal and teleological force, figure already in specifically homeostatic feedback explanations of certain biological phenomena.
When we explain that the organism V ed because it needed W , we may well be explaining both that the goal of the V ing was to satisfy the need for W and that it was the need for W that triggered the V ing.
In a recent article, Brian McLaughlin agrees that reason explanations are teleological, explaining an action in terms of a purpose, goal or aim for which it was performed.
He also agrees that these purposive explanations are not species of causal explanation. However, he rejects the view that these same explanations are grounded on claims about the agent's intentions in acting, and he thereby sets aside the issues, sketched above, about purpose, intention, and their role in rationalizations.
McLaughlin takes the following position: if i an agent F -ed for the purpose of G -ing, then, ii in F -ing, the agent was thereby trying to G.
To assert i is to offer an explanation of the action the F -ing in terms of the agent's trying to G. Moreover, if i is true then the act of F -ing is identical with or is a proper part of the agent's attempt to G.
Thus, statement ii offers what purports to be, in effect, a mere redescription of the act of F -ing. Michael Thompson has defended a position that makes a rather radical break from the familiar post-Davidson views on the explanation of action.
He rejects as misconceived the debates between causalist and non-causalist accounts of explaining action. He does not deny that actions are sometimes explained by appeal to wants, intentions, and attempts, but he thinks that the nature of these explanations is radically misunderstood in standard theorizing.
Thompson's overall position is novel, complex, and highly nuanced. It is sometimes elusive, and it is certainly not easy to summarize briefly. Nevertheless, it is a recent approach that has rapidly been drawing growing interest and support.
One of the principal arguments that was used to show that reason explanations of action could not be causal was the following.
If the agent's explaining reasons R were among the causes of his action A , then there must be some universal causal law which nomologically links the psychological factors in R together with other relevant conditions to the A -type action that they rationalize.
However, it was argued, there simply are no such psychological laws; there are no strict laws and co-ordinate conditions that ensure that a suitable action will be the invariant product of the combined presence of pertinent pro-attitudes, beliefs, and other psychological states.
Therefore, reasons can't be causes. Davidson accepted that the thesis, on this reading, is correct, and he has continued to accept it ever since.
The stronger reading says that there are no reason-to-action laws in any guise, including laws in which the psychological states and events are re-described in narrowly physical terms and the actions are re-described as bare movement.
Davidson affirms that there are laws of this second variety, whether we have discovered them or not. Many have felt that this position only lands Davidson qua causalist in deeper trouble.
It is not simply that we suppose that states of having certain pro-attitudes and of having corresponding means-end beliefs are among the causes of our actions.
We suppose further that the agent did what he did because the having of the pro-attitude and belief were states with respectively a conative and a cognitive nature, and even more importantly, they are psychological states with certain propositional contents.
The agent F 'ed at a given time, we think, because, at that time, he had a desire that represented F ing, and not some other act, as worthwhile or otherwise attractive to him.
Fred Dretske  gave a famous example in this connection. When the soprano's singing of the aria shatters the glass, it will have been facts about the acoustic properties of the singing that were relevant to the breaking.
The breaking does not depend upon the fact that she was singing lyrics and that those lyrics expressed such-and-such a content. In the case of action, by contrast, we believe that the contents of the agent's attitudes are causally relevant to behavior.
The contents of the agent's desires and beliefs not only help justify the action that is performed but, according to causalists at least, they play a causal role in determining the actions the agent was motivated to attempt.
It has been difficult to see how Davidson, rejecting laws of mental content as he does, is in any position to accommodate the intuitive counterfactual dependence of action on the content of the agent's motivating reasons.
His theory seems to offer no explication whatsoever of the fundamental role of mental content in reason explanations.
Nevertheless, it should be admitted that no one really has a very good theory of how mental content plays its role.
An enormous amount of research has been conducted to explicate what it is for propositional attitudes, realized as states of the nervous system, to express propositional contents at all.
Without some better consensus on this enormous topic, we are not likely to get far on the question of mental causation, and solid progress on the attribution of content may still leave it murky how the contents of attitudes can be among the causal factors that produce behavior.
In a fairly early phase of the debate over the causal status of reasons for action, Norman Malcolm  and Charles Taylor  defended the thesis that ordinary reason explanations stand in potential rivalry with the explanations of human and animal behavior the neural sciences can be expected to provide.
More recently, Jaegwon Kim  has revived this issue in a more general way, seeing the two modes of explanation as joint instances of a Principle of Explanatory Exclusion.
Influenced by Davidson, many philosophers reject more than just reason-to-action laws. They believe, more generally, that there are no laws that connect the reason-giving attitudes with any material states, events, and processes, under purely physical descriptions.
Just as certain function explanations in biology may not reduce to, but also certainly do not compete with, related causal explanations in molecular biology, so also non-causal reason explanations could be expected to co-exist with neural analyses of the causes of behavior.
Earlier we introduced the Cognitivist view that intentions are special kinds of beliefs, and that, consequently, practical reasoning is a special form of theoretical reasoning.
But an opposing tradition has been at least as equally prominent in the last twenty-five years of thinking about the nature of intention.
Philosophers in this tradition have turned their attention to the project of giving an account of intention that captures the fact that intentions are distinctive mental states, states which play unique roles in psychological explanations and which are subject to their own sorts of normative requirements.
On the simple desire-belief model, an intention is a combination of desire-belief states, and an action is intentional in virtue of standing in the appropriate relation to these simpler states.
For example, to say that someone intentionally turns on the air conditioner is just to explain her action by appealing to e.
Bratman motivated the idea that intentions are psychologically real and not reducible to desire-belief complexes by observing that they are motivationally distinctive, and subject to their own unique standards of rational appraisal.
First, he noted that intentions involve characteristic kinds of motivational commitment. Intentions are conduct controlling, in the sense that if you intend to F at t, and nothing changes before t, then other things equal you will F.
The same is clearly not true for desire; we habitually resist present-directed desires. Intentions resist reconsideration—they are relatively stable, in the sense that we take ourselves to be settled on a course of action when we intend it, and it seems to be irrational to reconsider an intention absent specific reason for doing so.
In addition, intentions put pressure on us to form further intentions in order to more efficiently coordinate our actions.
When we intend to go to the park, for example, we feel pressure to form intentions concerning how to get there, what to bring, etc.
Again, desires do not appear to be subject to norms of non-reconsideration, and they do not seem to put pressure on us to form further desires about means.
Bratman went on to provide a more rigorous characterization of the constitutive norms on intention, a characterization that has been hugely influential.
The applicability of these requirements to states of intention was, for Bratman, a further strike against the desire-belief model. The first norm requires agents to make their intentions consistent with one another.
Imagine that Mike intends to go to the game, and also intends to refrain from going. Mike seems obviously irrational.
Yet it would be in no way irrational for Mike to desire to go to the game and to desire to refrain from going.
So it appears that the irrationality of having inconsistent intentions cannot be explained by appealing to run of the mill norms on desire and belief.
Likewise, intentions seem subject to a norm of means-end coherence. If Mike intends to go to the game, and believes that he must buy a ticket in advance in order to go, then he is obviously irrational if he does not intend to buy a ticket provided he persists in intending to go to the game.
Again, merely desiring to go to the game, and believing that going to the game requires buying a ticket, would not be sufficient to render Mike irrational in the event that he failed to desire to buy one.
So again it appears that the norms on beliefs and desires cannot suffice to generate the norms on intentions. Finally, Bratman claimed that rational agents have intentions that are consistent with their beliefs.
The exact nature of this intention-belief consistency norm has since been the subject of considerable attention [Bratman , Wallace , Yaffe ]. But the general idea is that it is irrational to intend to F while also believing that one will not F —this would amount to an objectionable form of inconsistency.
Yet desiring to F while believing that one will not F seems like no rational error at all. As Bratman himself points out, it seems perfectly possible, and not irrational, to intend to stop at the library without believing that I will recognizing, say, my own forgetful nature.
If that is correct, then it is not immediately obvious why I could not permissibly intend to stop while also believing that I will not.
For example, consider again the norm of intention consistency, which convicts Mike of error when he intends to go to the game and also intends to refrain from going.
Above we suggested that this norm could not be explained by appealing to norms on desire, since it is permissible to have inconsistent desires.
But now imagine that the intention to F just is or necessarily involves the belief that one will F. Then intending to F , and intending to refrain from F -ing, will entail that one has contradictory beliefs.
So if the Cognitivist can help himself to this constitutive claim about the link between intending and believing, he appears to have an attractive explanation of the norm requiring intention consistency.
The status of this constitutive claim, and of the plausibility of deriving other norms e. Of course, if Bratman was right to contend that one can intend to F without believing that she will F , then the Cognitivist picture of intention seems doomed from the get-go.
Seen in another light, then, the conclusion that intentions are psychologically real and irreducible to simpler states may be vindicated by way of a critique of the motivations for Cognitivism.
In this vein, some philosophers notably Sarah Paul have influentially argued that the Cognitivist is committed to an unattractive picture of the justification of intention formation.
It seems to follow that intending constitutively involves forming a belief for which I lack sufficient evidence. Indeed, it appears that the only sort of consideration potentially counting in favor of the belief that I will F is my preference that this proposition turns out true.
So intending appears to be a form of wishful thinking on the Cognitivist picture of intentions. This can be seen as a troubling result, given that we ordinarily regard wishful thinking as deeply irrational and intending as perfectly rational.
The issues about intention just canvassed are an instance of a more general project of understanding the nature of our mental states by understanding the normative requirements that apply to them.
But the idea that there are distinctive norms on intention has been challenged from another direction as well. Niko Kolodny , , makes the skeptical claim that we have no reason to be rational, and one main consequence of this thought is that there are no distinctively rational norms on our propositional attitudes at all.
Raz argues for a similar claim, but restricts his skepticism to what he regards as the mythical norm of means-end coherence.
If Kolodny were correct, then the rational norms on intention would be explicable by appeal to the same principles as the norms on belief, and any other normatively assessable attitudes—and would moreover be, at best, pseudo-norms, or principles that merely appear normative to us.
This would not amount to a win for Cognitivism, since the explanation would turn on underlying features of all reasoning processes, and not on any necessary connection between the possession of intentions and beliefs.
In any event, this skeptical view about the authority and autonomy of rationality is highly controversial, and depends on disputed claims about reasoning and the logical form of rational requirements see Bridges , Broome , , Schroeder , , Finlay , Brunero , Shpall , Way Finally, Richard Holton , has initiated a new direction in contemporary work on the nature of intention with his advocacy of a novel theory of partial intentions.
On his view, partial intentions are intention-like states that figure as sub-strategies in the context of larger, more complex plans to accomplish a given end.
Such partial intentions are, Holton thinks, necessary for adequately rich psychological explanations: merely appealing to full intentions cannot succeed in capturing the wide range of phenomena that intention-like states appear to explain.
And much like credential doxastic states, partial intentions will presumably bring with them their own sets of norms.
Intuitively, having high credence that Spain will win the World Cup places me under different commitments than believing that Spain will win.
Likewise, only partially intending to steal the cookie from the cookie jar seems to be in some way normatively different than fully intending to steal the cookie.
If competing accounts of partial intention result in a more unified picture of partial attitudes is this a substantial consideration in their favor?
Consider accounts that link the notion of partial intention to the partial degree to which an agent is committed to the action in question.
Such accounts have a nice story to tell about the relationship between credential states and partial intentions—they are species of the same genus, in the sense that they involve not full but partial commitment to the proposition or action in question.
Thought about these questions is still in its early stages, but is likely to shed light on at least some of the central normative questions of interest to philosophers of action.
The Nature of Action and Agency 1. Intentional Action and Intention 3. The Explanation of Action 4. The Nature of Action and Agency It has been common to motivate a central question about the nature of action by invoking an intuitive distinction between the things that merely happen to people — the events they undergo — and the various things they genuinely do.
After all, the conditional, If the agent intends to F shortly and does not change her mind, then shortly she will at least try to F.
First, it is important to distinguish between phrases like a the agent's turning on the light and gerundive phrases such as b the agent's turning on of the light.
And yet none of this seems inevitable. It also carries no commitment, concerning the intrinsic character of the behavior that was aimed at F ing, whether one or several acts were performed in the course of trying, and whether any further bodily effects of the trying were themselves additional physical actions [see Cleveland ].
The conceptual situation is complicated by the fact that Bratman holds that 7 [The agent F 'd with the intention of G ing] is ambiguous between The agent F 'd with the aim or goal of G ing and The agent F 'd as part of a plan that incorporated an intention to G.
The Explanation of Action For many years, the most intensely debated topic in the philosophy of action concerned the explanation of intentional actions in terms of the agent's reasons for acting.
Wilson goes beyond Ginet in claiming that statements of intention in action have the meaning of 9 The agent's act of F ing was directed by him at [the objective] of G ing, In this analyzed form, the teleological character of ascriptions of intention in action is made explicit.
Or, alternatively, when a speaker explains that 10 The agent F 'd because he wanted to G , the agent's desire to G is cited in the explanation, not as a cause of the F ing, but rather as indicating a desired goal or end at which the act of F ing came to be directed.
Intentions and Rationality Earlier we introduced the Cognitivist view that intentions are special kinds of beliefs, and that, consequently, practical reasoning is a special form of theoretical reasoning.
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